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1 Introduction
Apparently, the prospects for punishment can deter crime. One particular
kind of punishment is a ne. Since this is a costless transfer, it has been
argued that the optimal ne is the maximal one (equal to the individuals
wealth). This is simply because it will lead to the highest possible deterrence
without causing any costs. This intuitive and straight forward argument was
rst introduced in Becker (1968). In this article we contribute to the debate
concerning optimal punishment by elaborating on a particular mechanism
that can explain why a tougher punishment may lead to a more severe crime.
When the punishment becomes tougher, criminals are encouraged to use
more resources to avoid being detected. This will reduce the probability of
detection which will, in turn, a¤ect the severeness of the crime that might be
committed. We apply our model to antitrust enforcement, where penalties
for cartel infringements have increased signicantly during the last decade.
For this particular o¤ence, it is shown that a higher ne for price xing can
lead to a higher overcharge instead of a higher deterrence rate. Our model
predicts that this unintended e¤ect of higher nes is present only when a
leniency program is in force.
Avoidance activities are common for many agents involved in criminal activ-
ities. For example, many persons install radar detectors to avoid speeding
tickets. Firms involved in antitrust violations may also spend resources to
avoid being detected. It is claimed that e¤orts to conceal illegal cartels, in
particular to hide information about meetings where they x prices, have
become even more sophisticated and elaborate with the escalation of com-
petition law enforcement in Europe and the US.1 This suggests that the
toughness of the punishment, for example the level of the ne, will inuence
agentse¤orts to hide criminal activities. This mechanism is at the heart of
1See Stephan (2009), where several examples of avoidance activities for cartel members
are listed. For example, they communicate through private email accounts and unregis-
tered mobile phones using encrypted messages; they avoid any contact through secretaries
or administrative sta¤; they hold meetings in foreign countries. Concerning cartels in EU,
it is found that the rms often have illegal meetings in Switzerland.
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our analysis.
Our starting point is a standard modeling approach where crime is protable
as such and there is a probability of detection followed by a punishment,
typically a ne. We model this as a repeated game, where each agent in
a group must decide whether or not to take part in committing a crime in
each period. In addition, if a crime is committed the agent has the option to
apply for leniency, i.e., informing the police and pay a lower ne. We assume
that the agents make two simultaneous decisions. Besides deciding on how
severe crime to commit, they can also decide to invest in costly avoidance
activity that leads to a lower probability of crime detection. In principle
then, for any given ne there exists an optimal mix of the crime level and
the avoidance activity. Given the endogenous avoidance activity, we consider
how an increased ne will a¤ect the crime level. An increased ne will lead
to a higher avoidance activity and thereby a lower probability of detection.
This may, in turn, make it protable to commit a more severe crime.
We show that whether an increased ne leads to a more severe crime de-
pends on whether the marginal ne or the ne level in general is increased.
Not surprisingly, if the marginal punishment is increased, so that the ne
increases more rapidly with the severeness of the crime, then the increased
ne has the intended e¤ect on the criminal activity. The agents avoid pay-
ing the higher ne by reducing the severeness of the crime. However, if the
ne is increased uniformly for any given crime level, so that the marginal
punishment is not a¤ected, the agents may react di¤erently. The higher ne
will certainly reduce the expected gain from committing the crime, and to
sustain a collusive equilibrium where no one informs the police, the agents
will have to invest to reduce the detection probability. The crime level is then
no longer at the optimal level, and will thus be adjusted to take into account
the now lower probability of detection. In a setting where the criminals have
to give up all the criminal surplus if detected, the optimal response to the
lower detection probability is clearly to increase the crime level. This is so
because the deviation prots, and hence the temptation to deviate, are then
not a¤ected by the criminal surplus.
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However, if the criminals can retain the illegal surplus even if the crime is
detected, they also have to take into account that a higher crime level will
make it more tempting to inform the police. The latter e¤ect makes it less
protable to increase the crime level, and thus indicates that the criminals
response to a higher ne will depend on whether or not they can retain the
illegal surplus after detection. The analysis conrms this intuition.
We apply our model to antitrust enforcement. It is a violation of competition
law if competing rms x prices, and the rms will typically be given nes
if they are detected and convicted. The crime is the overcharge (price above
the competitive price level), and we interpret a higher overcharge as a more
severe crime. The main di¤erence between the basic crime model and the
cartel model, is that there are now two ways in which an agent (or rm) can
deviate from a collusive equilibrium: either report to the antitrust authorities
and thereby apply for leniency, or deviate by setting a lower price and thus
appropriate the cartel prot. If the option to apply for leniency is the binding
constraint for the cartels choice of overcharge and avoidance activity, there
is no di¤erence between this antitrust model and the general setting outlined
above. Higher ne levels for detected cartels can in such a case lead to more
avoidance activity which, in turn, leads to a larger cartel overcharge. In
particular, a general increase in the ne level (rather than an increase in the
marginal ne) may lead to more avoidance activity and a higher overcharge.
Without a leniency program in place, however, a higher overcharge will al-
ways increase the temptation to appropriate the cartel prot by slashing
the price. An increase in the ne will in this case always lead to a lower
overcharge in order to discipline the incentive to deviate.
We also nd that even though there is a leniency program in place, the
binding constraint for the cartel can be that rms are tempted to slash prices.
However, the existence of a leniency program broadens the range of collusive
strategies. This occurs when the option to apply for leniency is used as
a credible threat to punish a rm who deviates from the cartel agreement
regarding pricing (and hence makes the agreement more sustainable). The
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deviating rm will then be ned and may also have to give up the illegal
gains. Hence, the presence of a leniency program may allow the cartel to
sustain higher overcharges, and an increase in the ne may lead to even
higher overcharges by the cartel. Thus, our model shows that introducing a
leniency program may (a) help to sustain the cartel and (b) also a¤ect in
some cases negatively the way the cartel reacts to higher nes.
The main mechanism behind these negative e¤ects is that leniency programs
enable rms to coordinate on equilibria in which all apply for leniency once
someone deviates. As a result, the overcharge level may not a¤ect the tempta-
tion to deviate from the cartel. One way to mitigate the negative e¤ects is to
let the rms retain cartel surplus after detection, so that a higher overcharge
also increases the temptation to deviate. We show that if the cartel surplus
is retained, the leniency program can be designed such that higher nes re-
duce the overcharge. This requires a su¢ ciently small di¤erence between the
leniency granted when a single rm applies and the leniency granted when
all rms apply.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we relate our approach
and results to the existing literature. In Section 3 we present our model and
the main result concerning the relationship between punishment and crime.
In Section 4 we apply our model to antitrust violations, focusing on how
higher nes can a¤ect the overcharge. Some concluding remarks are o¤ered
in Section 5, where we also contrast our results with the tougher ne policy
in many jurisdictions during the last decade.
2 Relation to the literature
The idea that nes should be set at a maximum, i.e., setting nes equal to
an individuals wealth, has been criticized by many.2 Malik (1990) was the
2For example, Stigler (1970) argued that it ignores the need to maintain marginal
deterrence since the ne for an o¤ense does not increase with its seriousness. Polinsky and
Shavell (1979) show that when persons are risk averse, the optimal ne is lower than the
o¤enders wealth.
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rst to model an o¤enders avoidance activity, and he found that if such an
activity is costly for society, it is an argument for setting nes lower than at
an individuals wealth.3 The reason is that a ne is no longer a costless trans-
fer. More recently, it has been shown that with the presence of avoidance
activities an increase in the punishment may have counterintuitive results.
In particular, both Langlais (2008) and Nussim and Tabbach (2009) have
shown that a tougher punishment may lead to more crime being committed.
Although the direct e¤ects of a tougher punishment is less crime and more
avoidance activity, they show that the interplay between crime and avoidance
may lead to such a counterintuitive result. Our modeling is in the same spirit
as theirs, with some important distinctions. First, in contrast to them we
endogenize the severeness of the crime, and show that more punishment can
lead to a more severe crime being committed. Second, we study a repeated
game model of organized crime, and tailor-make our model to antitrust vi-
olations, showing that higher nes for price xing can lead to even higher
overcharges.
There are studies that endogenize rmsavoidance activity concerning an-
titrust violations. For example, Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006) investigate
the incentive to destroy hard evidence of price xing. Their main issue,
though, is how whistleblowing programs may a¤ect the incentives to keep
hard evidence, and they do not discuss the relationship between the ne size
and the overcharge. Avramovich (2010) takes into account that avoidance
activities are costly.4 Her main concern is how each rm allocates resources
between avoidance activities and traditional cost reducing activities. In con-
trast, our main focus is on how a tougher punishment (which in this case
3Although not modelled, Friedman (1981) did argue that avoidance activities might be
relevant for the question of optimum enforcement. See also Skogh (1973), who discussed
how the costs of planning and carrying out o¤ences should a¤ect the optimal punish-
ment. It has also been argued that victim precaution, e¤ort by the victim that lowers the
probability of being injured by an o¤ender, will also lead to a ne that is lower then the
maximum one (see Hylton, 1996).
4See also Jellal and Souam (2004), who also consider a setting with an endogenous
detection probability. Both rms and inspectors make costly e¤ort to hide and discover
collusion, respectively. Their main issue is the design of the payment schemes for inspec-
tors.
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means a higher ne) will a¤ect the severeness of the crime (in this case the
overcharge).
The ambiguous e¤ects of the introduction of leniency programs on cartel
stability are also studied elsewhere in the literature.5 On one hand, leniency
programs can undermine the collusive outcome since a rm has the option to
report and thereby reduce, or even eliminate, any ne that it might otherwise
have to pay if the cartel is detected. On the other hand, the prospects for
a less severe punishment can make it more protable to form a cartel. Yet
another mechanism for how leniency programs a¤ect cartel stability is that
applying for leniency can be used as a threat against defecting rms and
thus also help to sustain the cartel. The latter approach is more in line with
our model.6 In contrast to the existing literature on leniency programs, we
investigate in detail how the presence of a leniency program will inuence
the e¤ect of higher nes on cartelsavoidance activities and, in turn, on the
overcharge.
In the existing literature it is seemingly a widely recognized result that le-
niency should be restricted to the rst informant only, as implemented in the
US leniency program. This is for instance found in the works of Harrington
(2008), Spagnolo (2008) as well as in Chen and Rey (2012). They all show
that letting leniency be limited to the rst informant maximizes the pro-
grams impact when it comes to destabilizing the cartel. Our results suggest
that it might be desirable to modify the design of the leniency program to
take into account the possible countervailing e¤ect of the rst-informant rule
on cartel stability. This suggests that the type of leniency program adopted
by EU might be more e¢ cient in this respect.
5This is shown in Motta and Polo (2003), and further analyzed in, among others,
Aubert et al. (2006) and Harrington (2008). For a survey of the literature, see Spagnolo
(2008).
6This e¤ect was rst discussed in Spagnolo (2000) and Ellis and Wilson (2001), and is
further elaborated in Chen and Harrington (2007).
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3 The model
We consider rst a basic model of crime and punishment, and then extend
and apply this model to antitrust enforcement in the next section of the
paper.
Consider a group of n agents who each period can cooperate on committing
a crime of seriousness , where  is determined by the group. The net
payo¤ from committing the crime equals  for each agent, where  > 1. If
one agent chooses not to cooperate, all agents earn  each. Let p denote the
probability that the crime is detected a given period. Assume that the agents
can reduce p, but that this is costly: Each agent has avoidance costs c(p)
where cp < 0. If the crime is detected, then each agent gets a punishment
F (), where F > 0; earning    F ().7 We also assume that detection
prevents the agents from cooperating in the future. After the crime has been
committed, but before it is potentially detected, agents can inform the police
and attain leniency, giving a utility u =    L + , where L < F is the
(reduced) punishment and  is a non-pecuniary utility from informing the
police.
We analyze a repeated relationship where the following stage game is played
each period:
1. The agents (simultaneously) choose whether or not to cooperate on a
crime  with avoidance costs c(p): If they cooperate the game proceeds
to stage 2. If they do not cooperate, the game ends.
2. The agents simultaneously choose whether or not to inform the police
and apply for leniency.
3. If no-one informs the police, the crime is detected with probability p.
We consider trigger strategies where the agents cooperate if all agents have
7For simplicity we assume that F () captures any kind of punishment, including im-
prisonment.
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cooperated in the past, while they choose not to cooperate forever after if at
least one agent have defected in the past.8
The present value of committing the crime each period is then, for each agent:
V (; p) = (1  p) [ + V (; p)] + p


1     F ()

  c(p) (1)
Solving for V yields
V (; p) =
(1  p)   c(p) + p( 
1    F ())
1  (1  p)
The present value of informing the authorities is u   c(p) + 
1  . An agent
will thus not inform the police if9
V (; p)  u  c(p) + 
1  
Our main question is now as follows: Will the agents commit a less severe
crime (here a lower ) if the punishment becomes stronger? To analyze this,
let  be a shift parameter with F > 0. The constraint to sustain cooperation
is now
V (; p;; ) =
(1  p)   c(p) + p( 
1    F (; ))
1  (1  p)  u+

1   c(p) (L)
Examining how the crime level () reacts to variations in the ne, we nd
the following:
Proposition 1 The relationship between crime  and punishment F is am-
8Not cooperating is the optimal punishment.
9Note that a general attribute with all leniency programs is that for the leniency con-
straint to be binding (and not the participation constraint), agents must earn more from
committing a crime and then report, than from not committing a crime at all. Since
V (; p)  1  , we must have u   c(p) >  for the constraint to be binding. Hence, the
constraint binds if  L c(p) > 0 , implying either a high  or a su¢ ciently low L (where
L < 0 is also possible).
9
biguous. In particular, a tougher punishment leads to a more severe crime
(0() > 0) if and only if:
 + F
1  (1  p)F + F
cp
1 + 
> 0;
where  > 0 is the shadow cost associated with the constraint (L). Thus, the
crime becomes more severe (0() > 0) if the level of the ne increases (F >
0) while the marginal ne remains constant (F = 0). And conversely, the
crime becomes less severe if the marginal ne increases (F > 0) while the
level of the ne stays constant (F = 0).
We see from this that a shift which increases the level of the ne without
a¤ecting its slope (F = 0 and F > 0) will lead to a more severe crime.
The reason why this type of tougher punishment leads to a more severe crime
can be seen more directly as follows. Note that the RHS of the constraint
(L) is independent of  and F . It is thus not directly a¤ected by changes in
the ne. Dene
~V (p;; ) = max

(1  p)   c(p) + p( 
1    F (; ))
1  (1  p)
i.e. the optimal value (wrt to crime level ) for given p.
The problem of maximizing V subject to the constraint is then equivalent
to maximizing ~V (p) subject to the constraint (i.e. subject to ~V (p)  u +

1    c(p)).
Consider now a shift that increases the level of the ne without a¤ecting its
slope (F = 0 and F > 0). This will shift down the value; we have
~V = V =
 pF
1  (1  p)
This downward shift will reduce p; the higher F is accommodated with in-
creased investments so as to reduce the detection probability. Note that the
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marginal value of  is
V =
(1  p)   pF
1  (1  p)
When F is una¤ected, the lower p will increase this marginal value and
hence make a heavier crime protable. The result is thus that  increases
and p is reduced. The higher ne/penalty level leads to a lower detection
probability and, in turn, to a more severe crime.
This illustrates that the ne policy as such, and in particular whether the
marginal punishment changes or not, is crucial for whether tougher punish-
ment has an unintended a¤ect shown in Proposition 1.
3.1 Retaining surplus after detection
In the basic model, we have made the assumption that the agents cannot
retain any surplus from the criminal activity if they are being detected. Let
us now assume that they can consume the criminal surplus before they
are detected so that the rst period payo¤ after detection is    F () ,
which also implies that the rst period payo¤ after being granted leniency is
u =    L + . As we shall see, this implies a less ambiguous relationship
between crime and punishment, since it turns out that 0() < 0 is possible
also for F = 0.10
The present value of committing the crime is now, for each agent:
V (; p) = (1  p) [ + V (; p)] + p

 +

1     F ()

  c(p)
=  + (1  p)V (; p) + p


1     F ()

  c(p)
10It is true for this case as well that 0() < 0 if F > 0 and F = 0, i.e. that a higher
marginal ne yields a reduced crime level. Formally this can be seen from the formulas
(7) and (8) in the proof of Proposition 2 below.
11
Solving for V yields
V (; p) =
   c(p) + p( 
1    F ())
1  (1  p)
An agent will not inform the police if V (; p)   L  c(p) + 
1  . So the
problem here is to maximize V (; p) subject to
V (; p) =
   c(p) + p( 
1    F ())
1  (1  p)     L  c(p) +

1   (M)
Let now  = 
+1
2 [0; 1) be a transformation of the Lagrange multiplier 
for the constraint (M), and let "(p) =   cpp
cp
(1   p) > 0 denote the elasticity
of the marginal cost function. Here we get the following.
Proposition 2 Given that F = 0 (the marginal punishment remains con-
stant), for the model with constraint (M) we have that a higher punishment
(F > 0) leads to a a more severe crime (0() > 0) if:
"(p)

  1
1  p   

p+ [(1  )(2  ) + (1  2p)] > 0 (2)
A tougher punishment thus leads to a more severe crime (0() > 0) if:
1  ("(p) + 2)p > 0 for ! 1 (3)
1   + 1  ("(p) + 1)p
1  p > 0 for ! 0 (4)
The elasticity of the marginal cost function a¤ects the agentsresponsiveness
regarding p, and this in turn a¤ects their response regarding . Given that
the elasticity is bounded, we see that for the limiting cases ( ! 1,  ! 0)
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the sign of 0() is positive only if the (equilibrium) probability of detection
(p) is small. Hence, higher punishment will more often lead to less severe
crime in this case where the agents can consume the criminal value before
they are detected. The reason is that it is tempting to deviate to reap the
benet from the crime, and the severeness of the crime must be reduced to
avoid such a deviation.
This does not mean that 0() > 0 is not possible. For quadratic costs
c(p) = k(1  p)2 the elasticity is "(p) =   cpp
cp
(1  p) = 1, so the expression in
(3) is positive for p < 1
3
, while the expression in (4) is (for ! 0) certainly
positive for p  1
2
.
We see that the scope for an unintended e¤ect of a higher punishment is
more limited when the agents can retain the surplus after detection. The
reason is that in such a case the agents can nd it tempting to inform the
police, since they even then can retain the criminal surplus. To avoid such
an outcome, it is less likely that the agents set a higher crime level when the
probability of detection is reduced.
Formally this is captured by constraint (M) being more di¢ cult to satisfy
for higher  than constraint (L). First, the deviation prot is larger; there
is an additional term (  1) on the RHS of (M) compared to (L). Second,
although the collusive prot value is also larger  the di¤erence in values
amounts to p( 1)
1 (1 p) this higher value does not make up for the higher devi-
ation prot. (The net di¤erence is ( p
1 (1 p)  1)( 1), which is decreasing
in .) Hence the retained surplus makes constraint (M) more di¢ cult to sat-
isfy for higher  than constraint (L), and the cartel therefore more reluctant
to increase  in this case.
4 Antitrust enforcement
We now extend and apply the basic model in Section 3 to study antitrust
enforcement. Forming a cartel is then the criminal activity, and the prot
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from overcharge is the crime level. Let k = (pC   pN)=pN denote cartel
overcharge where pC is cartel price and pN is the non-collusive price. Each
rms (per period) prot from collusion is (k),  > 1. If the rms do not
collude, they earn  each. If all other rms are colluding, a rms prot from
deviation is , where  > 1. As before, p denotes the probability that the
cartel is detected within a given period. If a rm is detected, it gets a ne
F () in addition to a restitution ne that permits to seize back the illegal
prots realized by the cartel (in the given period). The payo¤ after detection
is then    F ():
The cartel faces avoidance costs c(p) per rm per period. Since the overcharge
k only works via , we will (mostly) omit the variable k in what follows. The
present value of repeated cartel activity is then given by
V (; p) = (1  p) [ + V (; p)] + p


1     F ()

  c(p) (5)
which is exactly the same as in the basic model in the previous section.
Consider now the following stage game:
1. The cartel agrees on overcharge k (and thus ) and hiding costs c(p):
2. Firms set prices. They can honor the cartel agreement or deviate by
lowering the price.
3. Firms can report to the competition authority (CA) about the cartel
and apply for leniency. If leniency is admitted, the expected ne is
L(m) < F , where m  1 is the number of rms applying for leniency.
Any non-applicant is then ned F .
4. If no-one applies for leniency, CA detects the cartel with probability p.
When the stage game is played repeatedly, rms play trigger strategies: If
at least one rm deviates by lowering the price or applies for leniency, the
game reverts to non-cooperative Nash strategy forever after, earning  each.
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Now, the major di¤erence between the basic crime model, and the cartel
model, is that the agents (labeled rms in this section) can deviate by charg-
ing a lower price and thus appropriate the cartel prot. Hence there are two
ways in which a rm can in principle deviate: Report to CA or just deviate
from the cartel agreement without reporting.
First note that a strategy prole where all rms apply for leniency in Stage
3 (and then revert to Nash play) is a continuation equilibrium in that stage,
irrespective of the outcome in stage 2. As long as at least one rm applies, it
is a best response for another rm to also apply, because of the milder pun-
ishment under leniency. This is in particular an equilibrium after a deviation
in Stage 2, and we will assume that the rms play this strategy prole after
such a deviation.11 A rm will then not deviate from the collusive agreement
in Stage 2 if
V (; p)     L+  + 
1     c(p) (L)
where now L = L(n).
Given no deviation in Stage 2, it is a continuation equilibrium that no rm
applies for leniency in Stage 3 if condition (L) holds for L = L(1). Since it
is reasonable to assume  L(1)   L(n), the requirement in condition (L)
is stronger for L = L(1) than for L = L(n). Hence, if the requirement to
deter a rst deviation in Stage 3 (after no previous deviations) is fulllled,
then the requirement to deter a rst deviation in Stage 2 is also fulllled.
This equilibrium will thus be sustained if condition (L) holds for L = L(1),
and in equilibrium no-one will then deviate from the collusive agreement. To
simplify notation, we will in the following take L to mean L(1).
There are of course other equilibria. In particular, a strategy prole where no
rm applies for leniency in stage 3 after a deviation in stage 2 is a continuation
equilibrium if pF  L. If rms play according to this strategy, then a
unilateral deviation in stage 2 is not protable (for pF  L) if
11If pF  L, it is also a continuation equilibrium that no rm applies for leniency. This
is discussed below in the text.
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V (; p)  (1  p) + p(   F ) + 
1     c(p) (D)
Given this continuation equilibrium, it is an overall equilibrium that no-one
ever deviates if condition (L) holds (to deter a rst deviation in stage 3)
and in addition that condition (D) holds if pF  L. The requirement that
both these conditions hold is of course a (weakly) stronger requirement than
requiring only condition (L) to be fullled. The attainable value V in this
equilibrium must therefore be (weakly) lower than the attainable value in
the equilibrium considered above (where only condition (L) is required). We
therefore assume that the cartel coordinates on the former equilibrium.
To attain a maximal value, the cartel thus maximizes V (; p) subject to
(L) which is the same as the problem in the previous section.12 The cartel
chooses the crime level  by choosing the cartel price pC and thus overcharge
k = (pC   pN)=pN , where 0(k) > 0 as long as pC does not exceed the
monopoly price pM . Then the condition in Proposition 1 applies, and we
have the following result:
Proposition 3 When the leniency program binds, a higher ne leads to a
higher overcharge (0() > 0) if the condition in Proposition 1 is met. In
particular, the overcharge increases if the level of the ne increases (F > 0)
while the marginal ne remains constant (F = 0).
The results shown earlier thus carry over to the case of antitrust enforcement
with a binding leniency program. As shown above, higher nes may well lead
to higher overcharges.
If there were no leniency program present, i.e. if it was not possible to apply
for leniency in Stage 3 of the game above, condition (D) would be the (single)
relevant condition for sustaining the cartel.13 It is convenient to rewrite this
12Similarly to the previous section, for the leniency constraint to be binding (and not the
participation constraint V (; p)  1  ), we must here have  L + v   c(p) > 0, implying
either a high v or a su¢ ciently low L (where L < 0 is also possible).
13The participation constraint is not relevant in this case, since as we show below, (D)
is equivalent to condition (DV), and is hence a stricter condition.
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condition somewhat. Using the expression for V (; p) given in (5) above, we
see that (D) can be written as
(1  p) [ + V (; p)] + p


1     

 (1  p) + 
1  
By collecting terms and dividing by (1   p), we see that this condition is
equivalent to
V (; p)  1

(   1) + 1
1   (DV)
We now obtain the following comparative statics result:
Proposition 4 When there is no leniency program, and the relevant con-
straint (D) to sustain the cartel binds, a higher ne F will always lead to
lower cartel overcharge (0(F ) < 0).
When the constraint (D) or equivalently (DV) binds, the elasticity of cp
does not matter because an increase in  would also increase the temptation
to deviate. An increase in the ne will in this case always lead to a lower
overcharge in order to discipline the incentive to deviate. The higher ne
will lead to larger investment in avoidance activity and to a reduction in the
detection probability. In isolation, this would make it tempting to commit
a more severe crime. This is not optimal in this case since it would increase
the incentive to deviate.
The results in the last two propositions show that the cartel may react quite
di¤erently to a higher ne, depending on whether a leniency program is in
place or not. When such a program is present, higher nes may well lead to
higher overcharges by the cartel, while if it is not in place, a higher ne will
always result in a lower overcharge.14
As the analysis here also has pointed out, the mere sustainability of the
cartel may depend on whether a leniency program is in place or not. In
particular, the relevant constraint (D) or equivalently (DV) to sustain
14It is straightforward to show that a lower overcharge will result also if the constraint
(D) is not binding, which will be the case if, say,  is high.
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the cartel in the absence of a leniency program, may be stricter than the
relevant constraint (L) when a program is present. Comparing constraints
(L) and (DV), we see that this is the case when
1

(   1) >  L+    c(p) (6)
In such cases constraint (L) may hold, but not constraint (D). This will
imply that, whenever the cartel is viable with no leniency program in place,
it will also be viable when such a program is present, but not the other way
around.15 The intuition for this is that applying for leniency can be used as
a credible threat to punish a rm who deviates from the cartel agreement
regarding pricing, and hence make this agreement more sustainable.
Summing up, we have seen that introducing a leniency program may (a) help
to sustain the cartel, but (b) also a¤ect and in some cases negatively the
way the cartel reacts to higher nes.
4.1 Retaining surplus after detection
Assume, as in Section 3.1 that the agents (now rms in the cartel) can
retain the surplus after detection. This means that we no longer impose a
restitution ne, as we allowed for in the previous discussion in this Section.
If no-one deviates, the cartel value is then, as in Section 3.1, given by
V (; p) = (1  p) [ + V (; p)] + p

 +

1     F ()

  c(p)
=  + (1  p)V (; p) + p


1     F ()

  c(p)
15Condition (6) wil denitely hold if  L+v  c(p)  0, but then the relevant constraint
under leniency is the participation constraint; see fn. 11 above. The leniency program
will then still ease cartel viability, since the participation constraint is always weaker than
(DV).
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Absent a leniency program, the condition to sustain the cartel is then
V (; p)     pF + 
1     c(p) (E)
When a leniency program is present, the condition to deter a rst deviation
in stage 3 (given no previous deviations) is
V (; p)     L+ v + 
1     c(p) (M)
where L = L(1). This is just as in Section 3.1.
As before, it is an equilibrium that all rms apply for leniency in Stage 3.
Assuming this equilibrium is played after a deviation in Stage 2, the condition
to deter such a deviation in Stage 2 is then
V (; p)     L(n) + v + 
1     c(p) (N)
It is not obvious whether this condition is stronger or weaker than (M). It
is stronger if (   1) > L(n)   L, i.e. if the prots gain from the price
deviation exceeds the loss from a less favorable leniency treatment. Denoting
the latter by L, we can write the conditions combined as
V (; p)     L+ v +maxf(   1)  L; 0g+ 
1     c(p) (MN)
where L = L(n)  L.
Comparing leniency and no leniency, ie comparing constraints (MN) and (E),
wee see that leniency entails a stricter constraint if
pF   L+ v +maxf(   1)  L; 0g > (   1)
If ( 1)  L, then the inequality above holds if pF L+v > ( 1),
i.e if the leniency program is su¢ ciently favorable (for a single applicant)
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and/or the ne is su¢ ciently large.
If ( 1) > L, then the inequality holds if pF  L(n)+v > 0. Thus, if a
price deviation is very protable ((   1) > L), the leniency constraint
will entail a stricter constraint for the cartel merely if pF  L(n) + v > 0. In
this case the (credible) threat to punish a price deviation by all applying for
leniency is not at all e¤ective in sustaining the cartel. On the contrary, the
leniency program (at least in this equilibrium) will make it more di¢ cult to
sustain the cartel.
The last considerations above have some implications for the design of a
leniency program. For given deviation protability ( 1), one may design
the system withL  ( 1), or withL < ( 1). In the former case
(a bigdi¤erence between the leniency treatments when all report and when
only a single rm reports), the leniency treatment of the single rm must be
very favorable in order for the program to negatively a¤ect the viability of
the cartel (L < pF + v   (   1)) This may not even be feasible, e.g. if
it requires L < 0.
An alternative is to design a program with a smaller di¤erence in the leniency
treatments between a single rm and all rms reporting (L < (   1)).
In this case the viability of the cartel is negatively a¤ected if just L(n) <
pF + v, which may well be feasible. This indicates that a program with
small di¤erences in leniency treatments may be more e¤ective in deterring
the cartel.
Regarding the way the cartel reacts to a higher ne, we obtain here the
following result:
Proposition 5 Assume the surplus is retained after detection.
(i) If L > (  1) (so that (M) is binding), the e¤ect of a higher ne on
the cartels overcharge is given as in Proposition 2.
(ii) If L < (   1) (so that (N) is binding), the e¤ect of a higher ne
tends to be smaller than in case (i): the marginal e¤ects in the two cases
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(0M() and 
0
N(), respectively); satisfy, all else equal; 
0
N() < 
0
M()
when F = 0 and F > 0
As we can see, this result shares some similarities with the results shown in
Proposition 2 for the general case of crime activity. When the agents can
retain surplus when deviating, there is less scope for an unintended e¤ect
of a higher ne on the overcharge. Again, the reason is that it becomes
more tempting to deviate since the agent can capture the short term gain. A
higher overcharge would make it even more protable to deviate, and there
is therefore less scope for the cartel members to respond by setting a higher
overcharge when the detection probability is reduced.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed a repeated game model of organized crime in
which criminals i) can spend resources in order to reduce the probability of
being detected and ii) are admitted reduced punishment if they inform the
police about a committed crime. Our analysis shows that a higher general
punishment level can increase the crime level. The reason is that higher
punishment-levels lead criminals to spend much more resources on hiding
their criminal activity, which in turn leads to lower probability of detection,
and thus weaker law enforcement, in equilibrium.
We then apply the model to antitrust enforcement. The main di¤erence
between the basic crime model, and the cartel model, is that the agents (or
rms) now can deviate by charging a lower price and thus appropriate the
cartel prot. Hence there are in principle two ways in which a rm can
deviate: report to the competition authority or just deviate from the cartel
agreement regarding pricing without reporting. As we have seen, the latter
behavior can be credibly deterred by the other rms when there is a leniency
program in place, and thus ease the sustainability of the cartel. And as
we also have shown, with a generous (binding) leniency program in place, a
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higher general ne level may lead to higher cartel overcharges. As this will
not occur in the absence of a leniency option, the analysis has pointed out
that introducing a leniency program may, under some conditions (notably
when surplus cannot be retained by the rms after detection) both help to
sustain the cartel, and also a¤ect the way the cartel reacts to higher nes.
We have also seen that leniency may help to deter the cartel (when surplus
can be retained), and that this may also a¤ect the way the cartel reacts to
higher nes.
We have found that it matters signicantly how the ne is increased. While
an increase in the marginal ne - the additional ne for an additional over-
charge - will always in itself lead to a lower overcharge, we nd that an
increase in the ne level as such may lead to more avoidance activity and, in
turn, a higher overcharge. During the last decade we have in many jurisdic-
tions seen a substantial increase in the nes for price xing. Unfortunately,
it seems as if the tougher sanctions are primarily implemented as an increase
in the ne level as such rather than higher nes for those cartels with the
highest overcharges. For example, according to the US guidelines the base
ne level should set at 20% of annual a¤ected commerce.16 It is argued that
the purpose of specifying a percent of the volume of commerce is to avoid the
time and expense that would be required for the court to determine actual gain
or loss.17 In EU, the ne is limited to 10% of the overall annual turnover
of the company. Although there is a scope for higher nes with more severe
o¤ences, it is not obvious that higher nes will be set in EU when cartels have
set higher overcharges.18 These observations, coupled with the observation
16Such a ne setting procedure may in itself produce some unintended e¤ects. As shown
in Bageri et al. (2012), a ne that is calculated as a percentage of the a¤ected commerce
will give the cartel incentive to set a price above the monopoly price and thereby to lower
the revenues.
17See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2R1.1 (2005). The base ne level should be
adjusted by a number of factors, such as adjusted upwards if bid rigging or other aggra-
vating factors are involved or downward if the rm cooperates with antitrust authority.
However, it is hard to see that such adjustments introduce anything that would imply that
the ne should depend on the actual damage.
18See Guidelines on the method of setting nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a)
of Regulation No 1/2003. The nes are increased in line with a set of aggravating cir-
cumstances which include recidivism, leading role, retaliatory measures against other
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that cartels with serious harm to society are still detected, indicates that we
should be concerned that the present ne policy can have unintended e¤ects
on cartelsovercharges.
undertakings, refusal to co-operate with or attempts to obstruct the European Commis-
sion in carrying out its investigation.
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
To accomodate both models (M) and (L), and in addition a case to be con-
sidered in a later section, introduce the index m 2 f0; 1g, the parameter
 > 1 and consider the following optimization problem
max
;p
V (; p;; ;m) s.t. G(p; ; ; ;m)  0;
where
V (; p;; ;m) =
   c(p) + p( 
1    F (; )) mp(  1)
1  (1  p)
and
G = V  H, with H = mu+ 
1     c(p) + (1 m) (   L)
Then model (L) is obtained for m = 1, and model (M) for m = 0;  = 1.
(The function H() equals the right hand sides of constraints (L) and (M),
respectively, for m = 1 and m = 0;  = 1.)
Forming the Lagrangian L = V + G, we have the following standard com-
parative statics result:
0() =
1
D
([LppG   LpGp]G + [LGp   LpG]Gp) ;
where D > 0 is the determinant of the bordered Hessian.
Note that from L = V +G, G = V  H and the FOCs Vk =  Gk, k = ; p,
we have
GkLij = GkVij +GkGij = (Vk  Hk)Vij   Vk(Vij  Hij) = VkHij  HkVij
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Substituting this in the formula for 0() yields
0()D = [(VHpp  HVpp)  (VpHp  HpVp)]G
+ [(VpH  HpV)  (VHp  HVp)]Gp
Note that H = 0 and hence G = V. From FOC we have 0 = Vp + Gp =
(1 + )Vp   Hp and thus Gp = Vp  Hp =  Hp=(1 + ) = cp=(1 + ) < 0.
So we have
0()D = [(VHpp  HVpp)  (VpHp  HpVp)]V
+ [ HpV +HVp] (cp)=(1 + )
We have H = (1 m). We further have from FOC Vp = 1+Hp =  cp >
0, where  = 
1+
, and V = 1+H = (1 m)
So we have, since Hp = 0
0()D = [((1 m)Hpp   (1 m)Vpp)  (0 + cpVp)]V (7)
+ [cpV + (1 m)Vp] (cp)=(1 + )
= [( cpp   Vpp) (1 m)   cpVp]V
+ [cpV + (1 m)Vp] (cp)=(1 + )
Consider
V =
 pF
1  (1  p) , V =
 pF
1  (1  p) , Vp =
 (1  )F
(1  (1  p))2 (8)
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Vp =
@
@p
   pF  mp
1  (1  p) (9)
=
( m   F) (1  (1  p))  [(1 mp)   pF] 
(1  (1  p))2
=
( m   F)
1  (1  p)   Va

1  (1  p)
=
( m   F)
1  (1  p)  
(1 m)
1  (1  p) (by FOC V = (1 m))
(I) For model L, where m = 1, we thus have
0()D = [ VpV + Vcp=(1 + )] cp
=

  (    F)
1  (1  p)
 pF
1  (1  p) +
 pF
1  (1  p)
cp
1 + 

cp
=

 + F
1  (1  p)F + F
cp
1 + 
  pcp
1  (1  p)
This proves the formula in Proposition 1.
(II) Consider now the case m = 0. (Model M is obtained for m = 0;  = 1.)
Suppose further that F = 0, and hence that V = 0. Then we have, from
the formulas (7), (8) and (9) above:
0()D = [( cpp   Vpp)    cpVp]V + [Vp] (cp)=(1 + )
=

( cpp   Vpp)    cp F   
1  (1  p)
  pF
1  (1  p) +
cp
1 + 
 (1  )F
(1  (1  p))2
We show below that we have
Vpp =
 cpp + 2cp
1  (1  p) < 0 (10)
Hence, dening D1 = (1  (1  p))2D, and noting that 11+ = 1  we then
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obtain
0()D1 = [ cpp(1  (1  p))   ( cpp + 2cp)  + cp (F + )] ( pF)
 cp(1  )(1  )F
=  fcpp [  1  (1  p)] p+ [ p+ pF= + (1  )(1  )] ( cp)gF
From FOC V = H =  we get
V =
   pF
1  (1  p) = 
and hence pF= = 1   (1  (1  p)) = 1   + (1  p).
This yields
0()D2 (11)
=  fcpp [  1  (1  p)] p+ [1=   + (1  2p) + (1  )(1  )] ( cp)gF
=  fcpp [  1  (1  p)] p+ [(1=   1) + (1  )(2  ) + (1  2p)] ( cp)gF
Setting  = 1 (as required in model M), we see that 0() has the same sign
as.
fcpp [  1  (1  p)] p+ [(1  )(2  ) + (1  2p)] ( cp)gF
Taking account of "(p) = cpp cp (1   p), we then obtain the formula (2) in
Proposition 2..
It remains to verify the formula (10) above. Consider, for m = 0:
Vp =
  cp + ( 1    F ) (1  (1  p))       c(p) + p( 1    F )
(1  (1  p))2
=
 cp + ( 1    F )
1  (1  p)  

1  (1  p)V
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Vpp =
 cpp (1  (1  p))  
  cp + ( 1    F )
(1  (1  p))2 +
2
(1  (1  p))2V  

1  (1  p)Vp
=
 cpp
1  (1  p)  

1  (1  p)
 cp + ( 1    F )
1  (1  p) +
2V
(1  (1  p))2  
Vp
1  (1  p)
=
 cpp
1  (1  p)  

1  (1  p)

Vp +

1  (1  p)V

+
2V
(1  (1  p))2  
Vp
1  (1  p)
=
 cpp
1  (1  p)  
2
1  (1  p)Vp
Then (10) follows from FOC Vp =  cp. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Taking the constraint (DV) into account, the optimization problem is now
of the form
max
;p
V (; p;F; ; ) s.t. G(p; ; F; ; )  0;
where V (; p;F; ; ) =
(1 p) c(;p)+p( 
1  F )
1 (1 p) and
G = V  H, with H(; ; ) =    1

 +
1
1  :
Let L = V +G be the Lagrangian. Given su¢ cient second order conditions
(SOC), standard comparative statics yield
0(F ) =
1
D
([LppG   LpGp]GF + [LFGp   LpFG]Gp) ;
where D > 0 is the determinant of the bordered Hessian of L.
Note that H() doesnt depend on p, nor on F , hence GF = VF and Gp = Vp.
From L = V + G, G = V   H and the FOCs 0 = Lk = Vk + Gk =
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Vk(1 + )  Hk, k = ; p, we then have Vp = 0 = Gp, and hence
0(F )D = [LppG   Lp0]VF + [LFGp   LpFG] 0
= LppGVF
Computing D from the bordered Hessian of L yields
D =  LppG2 + 2LpGGp   LG2p
=  LppG2
where the last equality follows from FOC; Gp = Vp = 0. Hence we now have
0(F ) =  GVF
G2
=  VF
G
From FOC 0 = V + G = V(1 + )   H we have H = V(1 + ) =
 G(1 + ). Hence
0(F ) =  VF
G
=   VF H=(1 + ) = (1 + )
VF
H
< 0
where the inequality follows from H > 0 and VF < 0. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
From the formula (11) in the proof of Propositions 1-2 we obtain the deriv-
ative 0M() for  = 1, and 
0
N() for  > 1. Using that formula we can
write
0N()D2
=  fcpp [  1  (1  p)] p+ [(1=   1) + (1  )(2  ) + (1  2p)] ( cp)gF
=  fcpp [  1  (1  p)] p+ [(1  )(2  ) + (1  2p)] ( cp)gF
+(1=   1) ( cp)F
= 0M()D2 + (1  ) ( cp)F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Hence
0N() = 
0
M() 

D2
(   1) ( cp)F (CMN)
This shows that, all else equal, 0N() < 
0
M(), and completes the proof.
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